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It is true that dignitary harms, because immaterial, are ephemeral to the legal 
mind.”1 
 
This paper examines the phenomenon of nonconsensual condom removal (NCCR) and its 
relationship to sexual assault in Canada. Using empirical studies and the insights of feminist 
theory, we explore the nature of the harms caused by NCCR and contend that this pervasive 
practice constitutes sexual assault. We then critique the decision of R v Hutchinson, which held 
that condom sabotage does not negate subjective consent, ignoring the dignitary harms of 
NCCR. While lower court decisions before Hutchinson recognized that consent to sex with a 
condom does not include consent to sex without, courts after Hutchinson have struggled to 
distinguish the decision in ways that lack coherence or have simply ignored the decision 
altogether. After briefly examining legislative amendments in other jurisdictions, we argue for a 
return to the fundamental finding in R v Ewanchuk that how sexual activity is carried out, 
including whether a condom is used, must be part of the subjective consent inquiry.  
 
Introduction 
Nonconsensual condom removal (NCCR)—the removal of a condom before or during 
sexual intercourse without one’s partner’s consent—is located at the intersections of sexual 
autonomy, sexual consent and sexual violence.2 NCCR can occur either through deception, when 
a sexual partner is tricked into believing her partner is wearing a condom, through condom 
tampering, or through outright refusal to wear a condom despite a partner’s expressed wishes. 
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1 Catharine A MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 1st ed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1989) at 173. 
2 See generally Sumayya Ebrahim, “I’m Not Sure This Is Rape, But: An Exposition of the Stealthing Trend” (2019) 
9:2 SAGE Open 1; Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape-adjacent: Imagining Legal Responses to Non-consensual Condom 
Removal” (2017) 32:2 Colum J Gender & L 183. 
NCCR is a pervasive practice that undermines women’s reproductive rights, sexual agency and 
equality.3  
The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Hutchinson4 held that condom deception could 
constitute fraud under section 265(3)(c) vitiating an otherwise valid consent but only where there 
was a significant risk of serious bodily harm. The accused in Hutchinson had poked holes in 
condoms in order to impregnate his sexual partner against her wishes.5 The majority decision in 
Hutchinson is about the definition of “sexual activity in question” under section 273.1 of the 
Criminal Code:6 that is, about exactly what one consents to in consenting to sex.7 While 
upholding the accused’s conviction for sexual assault, the majority decision constructed condom-
use as “collateral” to the consent inquiry,8 determining that where NCCR involves a deception, it 
can be criminalized through fraud vitiating an otherwise valid consent.  
It is important to distinguish between factors that negate consent directly and factors that 
only vitiate an otherwise valid consent. By including condom deception within the doctrine of 
fraud vitiating consent, the Court maintained that condom use does not go to the definition of 
consent itself but simply vitiates it for public policy reasons. This distinction between negating 
consent and vitiation is important because where there is no deception or no significant risk of 
serious bodily harm, both required to establish fraud vitiating consent, there will be no path to 
establishing sexual assault. As we demonstrate, a large majority of reported cases involve 
condom refusal, not condom deception. The issue of NCCR involving condom refusal will be 
 
3 See Konrad Czechowski et al, “‘That’s Not What Was Originally Agreed To’: Perceptions, Outcomes, and Legal 
Contextualization of Non-consensual Condom Removal in a Canadian Sample” (2019) 14:7 PloS One 1 at 21. 
4 2014 SCC 19 [Hutchinson SCC].  
5 See ibid at para 2. 
6 RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code]. 
7 See supra note 1 at paras 14–15. 
8 Ibid at paras 27–28. 
before the Supreme Court of Canada in November 2021 in R v Kirkpatrick.9 Interveners are 
asking the Court to retreat from its position in Hutchinson that condom use is collateral to 
consent.10  
In this paper, we argue that NCCR, whether deceptive or overt, must be understood as 
directly negating subjective consent to sexual intercourse. Our case law analysis reveals that 
prior to Hutchinson, courts took this approach and understood NCCR as negating subjective 
consent. Since Hutchinson, however, the case law has been contradictory—some courts squeeze 
NCCR into the sexual fraud framework, while others struggle to differentiate Hutchinson, and 
still others ignore the decision altogether. By narrowly constructing the harm of NCCR as its 
“physical” or “bodily” consequences, the Hutchinson majority approach inhibits legal 
recognition of how NCCR is experienced as harmful and degrading because it transgresses the 
limits of consent to the sexual activity in question. Agreeing to sex with a condom is a specific 
form of sexual activity and consenting to protected sex should never be viewed as implying 
agreement to unprotected penetration. As we emphasize, whether a condom is used is a vital part 
of how the sexual activity is carried out and insistence on condom use is a mechanism of setting 
limits on the degree of intimacy of a sexual encounter. 
In the first section of this paper, we respond to recent claims in the literature that NCCR 
is nothing more than a media-generated moral panic. Using empirical studies and the insights of 
feminist theory, we explore the harms caused by NCCR and contend that this pervasive practice 
demands legal regulation. As we emphasize, the transgression of sexual boundaries becomes 
 
9 SCC File No 39287. 
10 See e.g. SCC File No 39287 (Factum of the Intervener, Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic) at para 2, online 
(pdf): <https://scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/39287/FM090_Intervener_Barbra-Schlifer-
Commemorative-Clinic.pdf.>.. This was also the position taken in Lise Gotell & Isabel Grant, “Does ‘No, Not 
Without a Condom’ Mean ‘Yes, Even Without a Condom’?: The Fallout from R v Hutchinson” (2020) 43:2 Dal LJ 
767, commenting on R v Kirkpatrick, 2020 BCCA 136 [Kirkpatrick]. 
eroticized through NCCR, survivors are objectified and degraded, and this in turn reinforces 
systemic inequality. We then set out the legal landscape on consent and interrogate the Supreme 
Court of Canada decision in Hutchinson, and discuss why the majority, influenced by case law 
on HIV nondisclosure, might have taken such a narrow approach. Next, we examine cases 
decided both before and after Hutchinson in which complainants consented to sexual penetration 
with a condom, but not without, in order to illustrate the confusing legacy left by the Hutchinson 
decision. Many of these cases demonstrate the power and abuse inherent in removing a condom 
against the wishes of a sexual partner. While most judges appear to intuitively recognize the 
criminality in NCCR, some struggle with the doctrinal distinctions left by Hutchinson that 
suggest that only deceptive forms of condom removal that raise a significant risk of serious 
bodily harm will constitute sexual assault. Finally, we conclude with some thoughts on law 
reform and on how, as feminist legal scholars committed to substantive equality, we need to take 
up the challenge of forging a more principled basis for defining the scope of consent to sexual 
activity in a manner that includes how the sexual activity is carried out.11 
Non-consensual Condom Removal: Undermining of Women’s Sexual Agency 
The issue of NCCR entered popular culture with the publication of Alexandra Brodsky’s 
widely-cited 2017 article on “stealthing” in which she considered legal responses to deceptive 
condom removal during intercourse.12 Brodsky’s interrogation of stealthing as a consent 
violation and as an expression of gender-based violence has generated intense scholarly interest 
on the question of whether NCCR should be subject to legal regulation. Academic responses 
 
11 This paper does not address other birth-control deceptions that are not directly part of how the sexual activity 
takes place. Lying about a vasectomy, for example, might constitute fraud negating an otherwise valid consent 
where there is a significant risk of serious bodily harm (such as an unwanted pregnancy), but does not go directly to 
how the sexual activity is carried out.   
12 See generally Brodsky, supra note 2.  
have varied widely, with some scholars seeing the potential criminalization of NCCR as nothing 
more than a moral panic that demonstrates the dangerous excesses of “carceral feminism,” while 
others see the violation of condom use as negating consent and therefore as rape or sexual 
assault.13 Aya Gruber, in a book that charts how feminist-inspired criminal law reforms have 
fueled American mass incarceration, sees the recent focus on NCCR as part of an effort to “close 
loopholes in feminist crime control regimes.”14 Masculinities scholar Ashley Thomson goes 
further, insisting the “meteoric rise of interest around stealthing” is nothing more than media-
generated panic that bolsters a neoliberal agenda focused on punishment.15 In a more journalistic 
account, Judith Levine responds to recent law reform efforts in several US states, asserting that 
the impetus to criminalize NCCR stokes the “sex offender regime” that drives the prison-
industrial-complex.16  
This moral panic position rests upon an insistence that claims about NCCR have been 
grossly exaggerated. Addressing the rising concern about deceptive forms of condom removal, 
Thomson contends that there is no “objective social reality to speak of in the stealthing panic,” 
arguing that Brodsky offers no empirical support for her conclusions about the ubiquity of this 
practice or the men perpetrating it.17 She is particularly critical of how Brodsky based her 
conclusions on qualitative interviews with a small number of women, and how the problem of 
stealthing has, in turn, been spun by journalists and bloggers intent on increasing their own 
media presence. 
 
13 See e.g. Amanda Clough, “Conditional Consent and Purposeful Deception” (2018) 82:2 J Crim L 178; Joseph J 
Fischel, Screw Consent: A Better Politics of Sexual Justice, 1st ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019). 
14 Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime: The Unexpected Role of Women’s Liberation in Mass Incarceration, 1st 
ed (Oakland: University of California Press, 2020) at 170. 
15 Ashley Thomson, “The Stealthing Panic: Gendered Neoliberalism in Online Media” (2019) 64 Austl Humanities 
Rev 24 at 26.  
16 See Judith Levine, “Is Stealthing a Sex Crime?” (21 June 2017), online: Boston Review 
<bostonreview.net/gender-sexuality/judith-levine-stealthing-sex-crime>. 
17 Thomson, supra note 15 at 30. 
In arguing that its prevalence has been inflated by feminists, Thomson ignores a robust 
empirical literature on NCCR. Kelly Cue Davis and her colleagues have been engaged in 
quantitative analysis of the phenomenon of coercive condom use resistance for the past decade.18 
Their work, involving large scale surveys, focus groups, as well as experimental research, has 
found that nearly a third of young men who primarily date women admitted to engaging in 
condom removal without their partner’s consent, either through coercion, deception or 
aggression.19 Rosie L Latimer et al administered a questionnaire to more than 1000 people 
attending a sexual health clinic in Melbourne and found that 1/3 of women and 1/5 of men who 
had had penetrative sex with men reported experiencing NCCR (defined in this study as “the 
removal of a condom during sex by a sexual partner when consent has been given for sex with a 
condom only”).20 Allira Boadle et al conducted an online survey of young Australian women 
who had had sex with men and found that nearly 10% had experienced “a partner removing a 
condom during sex without their knowledge or consent.”21 Konrad Czechowski et al 
administered a survey to nearly 600 Canadian university students and found that of the 334 
 
18 Condom use resistance includes what researchers label as non-coercive tactics (including seduction, physical 
sensation arguments, emotional manipulation, relationship-based reasoning, risk reassurance and sex withholding), 
as well as coercive tactics (condom sabotage, deception and physical threats or force). As Davis and her colleagues 
have found, condom use resistance is widespread among young men, with almost 80% reporting that they engage in 
some form of condom use resistance. See e.g. Kelly Cue Davis et al, “A Qualitative Examination of Men’s Condom 
Use Attitudes and Resistance: ‘It’s Just Part of the Game’” (2014) 43:3 Archives of Sexual Behaviour 631 [Cue 
Davis et al, “A Qualitative Examination”]; Kelly Cue Davis et al, “Men’s Coercive Condom Use Resistance: The 
Roles of Sexual Aggression History, Alcohol Intoxication, and Partner Condom Negotiation” (2018) 24:11 Violence 
Against Women 1349; Kelly Cue Davis et al, “Young Women’s Experiences with Coercive and Noncoercive 
Condom Use Resistance: Examination of an Understudied Sexual Risk Behaviour” (2019) 29:3 Women’s Health 
Issues 231 [Cue Davis et al, “Young Women’s Experiences”]; Kelly Cue Davis, “‘Stealthing’: Factors Associated 
with Young Men’s Nonconsensual Condom Removal” (2019) 38:11 Health Psychology 997 [Cue Davis, 
“Stealthing: Factors Associated”]. 
19 See Cue Davis et al, “A Qualitative Examination”, supra note 18 at 633; Kelly Cue Davis & Patricia Logan-
Greene, “Young Men’s Aggressive Tactics to Avoid Condom Use” (2012) 36:4 Social Work Research 223 at 228. 
20 Rosie L Latimer et al, “Non-Consensual Condom Removal, Reported by Patients at a Sexual Health Clinic in 
Melbourne, Australia” (2018) 13:12 PloS One 1 at 1. 
21 Allira Boadle, Catherine Gierner & Simone Buzwell, “Young Women Subjected to Nonconsensual Condom 
Removal: Prevalence, Risk Factors, and Sexual Self-Perceptions” (2020) 27:10 Violence Against Women 1696 at 
1706. 
participants who had had penetrative sex with men, 32% of women and 19% of men had 
experienced the removal of a condom before or during sexual intercourse either without their 
consent or without their knowledge.22 A growing body of empirical research, then, clearly points 
to the pervasiveness of NCCR.23 Brodsky’s work on deceptive forms of NCCR may well have 
gone viral because it helped women put a name to a widespread experience.   
Just as the moral panic position ignores empirical evidence about the widespread nature 
of NCCR, so too does it minimize the connections between this set of practices and gender 
inequality. In part, this is accomplished by reducing the complex dynamics involved in NCCR to 
the realm of the physical. There is a tendency to view motivations of perpetrators as narrowly 
tied to the pursuit of sexual pleasure, while ignoring the complex subjective and collective harms 
caused by NCCR that include but extend beyond the physical risks of pregnancy or sexually 
transmitted infections. This restricted definition of harm weaves through the arguments of the 
proponents of the moral panic thesis, just as it defines the Canadian legal approach to NCCR 
post–Hutchinson. As Levine asks, for example, is the “usurpation of consent” involved in NCCR 
enough to warrant legal intervention when “no sexually transmitted infection is contracted, and 
no one gets pregnant”?24  
It is critical to displace this myopic emphasis on physical pleasure and bodily harm, and 
to instead focus on the connections between power, control, and the contravention of sexual 
boundaries on the one hand, and NCCR on the other. By requiring that one’s sexual partner wear 
a condom, a woman is not only seeking to protect herself from the physical consequences of 
sexual penetration, she is also setting limits on the intimacy of a sexual encounter—on how the 
 
22 Czechowski et al, supra note 3 at 16. 
23 See also Ebrahim, supra note 2 at 3. 
24 Levine, supra note 16.  
sexual activity occurs. In their study of women’s negotiation of condom use with men, Nicola 
Gavey et al demonstrated how the insistence on condoms is a mechanism of controlling both the 
course and outcomes of heterosexual encounters.25 Because NCCR represents a deliberate 
transgression of women’s sexual boundaries, it should be understood as a practice of masculine 
dominance over female sexuality and reproduction.26 As Davis underscores, hegemonic gender 
norms—including an emphasis on dominance, power, and control—can socialize men in ways 
that increase their risk of perpetrating NCCR.27 Easy access to pornography, where NCCR is 
portrayed as a tactic of male conquest, has also been found to be a contributing factor.28 Having a 
sexual assault perpetration history is also predictive of an intention to engage in NCCR, and men 
who hold misogynist beliefs have much higher likelihoods of engaging in it.29  
Brodsky’s work also draws attention to the motivations behind deceptive forms of 
NCCR, describing online communities where men share their stealthing practices and rationalize 
their behaviour through misogynist discourses, like their “right to spread their seed.”30 Brodsky 
highlights the close connections between online stealthing proponents and the pickup artist 
community, a subgroup of the men’s rights movement advocating sexual conquest through 
strategies such as deception and manipulation. This seduction paradigm is rooted in an 
increasingly dominant form of heterosexual masculinity in which masculine status is based upon 
“getting” women and being “chosen” for sex.31 Overcoming women’s resistance through 
 
25 See Nicola Gavey, Kathryn McPhillips & Marion Doherty, “‘If It’s Not On, It’s Not On’: Or Is It? Discursive 
Constraints on Women’s Condom Use” (2001) 15:6 Gender & Society 917 at 931. 
26 See generally Ebrahim, supra note 2; Brodsky, supra note 2; Cue Davis et al, “Young Women’s Experiences”, 
supra note 18; Boadle, Gierner & Buzwell, supra note 21.  
27 See Cue Davis, “Stealthing: Factors Associated”, supra note 18 at 997. 
28 See e.g. Marwa Ahmad, “‘You Do It without Their Knowledge.’ Assessing Knowledge and Perception of 
Stealthing Among College Students” (2020) 17:10 Intl J Environ Res Public Health at 6. 
29 See Cue Davis, “Stealthing: Factors Associated”, supra note 18 at 997. 
30 Brodsky, supra note 2 at 189. See also Gotell & Grant, supra note 10 at 787. 
31 See Ben A McJunkin, “Deconstructing Rape by Fraud” (2014) 28:1 Colum J Gender & L 1 at 26. 
manipulation and deception is made into a contest of masculinity. It is not simply that men who 
engage in NCCR disregard their victims’ reproductive rights and sexual agency, but they may in 
fact be aroused by it.32 Exemplifying Catharine MacKinnon’s theoretical arguments about the 
eroticization of domination, it is the transgression of boundaries through NCCR that makes 
perpetrators feel aroused, powerful, and masculine.33 
Dominant discourses of heterosexual masculinity—emphasizing power, control, and 
objectification—are also in evidence in how women subjectively experience NCCR, as well as 
the systemic, collective implications of this set of practices. Czechowski et al asked their survey 
participants a series of open-ended questions about whether they felt NCCR was wrong, and on 
what basis. Nearly all of the 432 women participants felt it was wrong. While many women 
participants described the harms in terms of potential outcomes, such as the physical risks of 
pregnancy (36.6%) or STIs (35%), the majority conceptualized NCCR as a consent violation 
(61.3%) (“participants expressed that consent to sex with a condom is separate from consent 
without a condom,” since “[their] answer to having sex could change whether or not [there] is 
protection””).34 A minority (15.3%) also saw it as a betrayal of trust, and some (5.5%) explicitly 
labelled it “sexual violence.35 The women in Brodsky’s article experienced deceptive condom 
removal as a “disempowering, demeaning violation of a sexual agreement” and conceptualized 
NCCR as an act of control.36 Boadle et al found that NCCR undermines women’s sexual agency; 
survivors were less confident to refuse sexual advances and felt less in control of themselves 
sexually. As they contend, “women who experienced NCCR developed negative self-perceptions 
 
32 See Ebrahim, supra note 2 at 6. 
33 See generally MacKinnon, supra note 1. 
34 Czechowski et al, supra note 3 at 11–12. 
35 Ibid at 11–13. 
36 Brodsky, supra note 2 at 186. 
about their sexual agency after being exposed to a sexual encounter that violated their bodily 
autonomy.”37 As these studies emphasize, women view NCCR as a violation of sexual 
boundaries that negates their consent, causing complex forms of harm, whether or not their 
partners use deception, and whether or not they experience a risk of pregnancy or STIs. 
These damaging experiences of disempowerment and violation are reinforced by the 
uncertainty regarding the legality of what has occurred. Even as attitudes around sexual assault 
shift in the #MeToo era, the myth of “real rape” as violent stranger rape continues to hold sway, 
shaping perceptions of experiences of NCCR, as well as the responses of criminal justice 
actors.38 There are very high rates of “unacknowledged rape” in circumstances that depart from 
this stereotype.39 As Breanna Chesser and April Zahra have argued in their discussion of legal 
responses to NCCR, “where a complainant’s account deviates from the stereotypical incidence of 
sexual assault, offences are left largely unreported.”40 The lack of clarity in the law about 
whether condom refusal, removal, deception, and sabotage negate consent to the sexual activity 
in question no doubt deters survivors from coming forward to make police reports.41 Just as 
 
37 Boadle, Gierner & Buzwell, supra note 21 at 1708. 
38 See generally Elaine Craig, “Feminism, Public Dialogue and Sexual Assault Law” in Fiona MacDonald & 
Alexandra Dobrowolsky, eds, Turbulent Times, Transformational Possibilities?: Gender and Politics Today and 
Tomorrow (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020) 100.  
39 See Holly Johnson, “Limits of a Criminal Justice Response: Trends in Police and Court Processing of Sexual 
Assault” in Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism (Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa Press, 2012) 613 at 613; Sylvie Lévesque & Catherine Rousseau, “Young Women’s 
Acknowledgment of Reproductive Coercion: A Qualitative Analysis” (2021) 36:15-16 Journal of Interpersonal 
Violence NP8200 at NP8204. 
40 Brianna Chesser & April Zahra, “Stealthing: A Criminal Offence?” (2019) 31:2 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 
217 at 219.  
41 As American researchers Laura C Wilson and Katherine E Miller have found in their metanalysis of the 
prevalence of unacknowledged rape, as many as 60% of women who report having experiences that meet the legal 
definition of rape do not label their experiences as rape; they instead use more benign labels such as “bad sex” or 
“miscommunication”: Laura C Wilson & Katherine E Miller, “Meta-Analysis of the Prevalence 
of Unacknowledged Rape” (2016) 17:2 Trauma, Violence & Abuse 149 at 149. While most survivors describe that 
they experienced NCCR as non-consensual sex, many are reluctant to reach the logical conclusion that non-
consensual sex is a form of “sexual assault” or “rape” because of the consequences of defining oneself as a victim 
and stereotypes around what is a “real” rape. In qualitative research with women who had experienced reproductive 
coercion and NCCR, Sylvie Lévesque and Catherine Rousseau found that survivors were reluctant to label their 
experiences as sexual aggression. A number of factors impeded this acknowledgement, including: assuming 
concerning, and because law plays such a powerful role in shaping “attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviour through its messages and lessons,” the uncertain legal status of NCCR represents a 
failure to harness law’s expressive role.42 As Danielle Citron argues, when public sentiment 
about a specific behaviour is unclear, the law can play a role in shifting behaviours, and by 
recognizing forms of harm, the law can ideally restore some of the agency that sexual 
victimization took away.43 
Because the purpose of sexual assault law is to protect sexual integrity, it is important for 
us to consider the harms of NCCR from the perspective of survivors. But it is also important to 
interrogate the obvious connections between individual violations and substantive inequality. A 
liberal, individualized conceptualization of autonomy can limit our ability to fully appreciate the 
harms of NCCR, or of sexual violence more generally.44 Overriding a woman’s insistence on 
condom use reinforces sexual inequality at a systemic level. As Sharon Marcus contends, we 
need to pay attention to the interplay between social structures that inscribe “‘misogynistic 
inequalities’ upon gendered bodies in a manner that allows rape to occur.”45 Despite increasing 
representations of women as sexually empowered, aggression and deception remain deeply 
entrenched in hetero-patriarchal sexual scripts, with normative hetero-sex still depicted as 
something that men do to women.46 NCCR denies the survivor of her status as subject, 
constructing her sexuality as an instrument of the perpetrator’s purposes. The harms of NCCR 
 
responsibility; downplaying the incident; being in an intimate relationship marked by violence; and having difficulty 
self-identifying as a victim. The women interviewed by Lévesque and Rousseau who had experienced NCCR 
blamed themselves, believing that “they should have made it clearer that they had not consented, even though they 
had repeatedly said that they wanted to use a condom.” Lévesque & Rousseau, supra note 39 at NP8213. 
42 Danielle Keats Citron, “Sexual Privacy” (2019) 128:7 Yale LJ 1874 at 1945 
43 See generally ibid. 
44 See Ebrahim, supra note 2 at 4. 
45 Sharon Marcus, “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention” in Judith Butler 
and Joan Wallach Scott, eds, Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge, 1992) 385 at 391. 
46 See e.g. Kristen N Jozkowski & Zoë D Peterson, “College Students and Sexual Consent: Unique Insights” (2013) 
50:6 J Sex Research 517 at 519. 
(like the harms of sexual assault more generally) are located in its particular violation of the 
subjective, bodily integrity of the survivor, whose personhood is denied, in addition to the 
increased risk to which she is subjected.47 The objectification inherent in NCCR reinforces male-
dominated heterosexuality by denying women their status as sexual subjects who can choose 
what sexual activity in which to engage. Individual experiences of NCCR shore up their social 
function and vice versa, as the two levels of effect are intricately related. 
Those who advance the moral panic position ignore these systemic harms and obfuscate 
the connections between NCCR and women’s inequality. While acknowledging that NCCR may 
be an ethical wrong, Thomson locates calls for legal regulation within the punitive logic of 
“gendered neoliberalism.”48 She castigates those feminists who insist upon the recognition of 
NCCR as a legal wrong as “carceral”. Decrying feminist participation in punitive logics, Levine 
contends that sex is inevitably a “risky business” and implies that individual responsibility and 
risk-management should be the preferred responses of potential victims to the moral harms 
caused by NCCR.49 
Both Levine and Thomson are contributing to an important debate about the limits of 
criminalization, and the implications for stigmatized communities, such as people who are HIV 
positive. However, taken to their logical end, such critiques veer towards the decriminalization of 
sexual violence, because NCCR is no different than other consent violations. We do not require 
pregnancy or the transmission of an STI to recognize the harm of sexual assault or rape in other 
contexts. By trivializing the experience of NCCR, these critics embed a troubling form of sexual 
libertarianism that characterizes the critiques of the carceral feminism thesis more generally. 
 
47 See Ann J Cahill, Rethinking Rape, 1st ed (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001) at 142. 
48 See Thomson, supra note 15 at 25. 
49 See Levine, supra note 16.  
This is a postfeminist form of anti-statism, in which state regulation of sexual harm is 
condemned as schoolmarmish.50 The carceral feminism critique paints an inaccurate picture of 
the state as a monolithic instrument captured by governance feminists.51 Not only does this 
overstate the contemporary power of feminism in contexts of neoliberalism and rising right-wing 
populism, but this position also risks re-privatizing and depoliticizing the gendered problem of 
sexual violence. The carceral feminism critique also misrepresents the feminist criminal law 
reform agenda, an agenda that, at least in Canada, has never been primarily focused on 
punishment. Instead, as Lise Gotell has demonstrated, Canadian feminist engagement with 
criminal law has been largely directed at survivor-centered outcomes, including the extent to 
which law reflects and condemns women’s experiences of sexual violence, while attempting to 
prevent legal revictimization of survivors.52  
Given its serious bodily, dignitary, and collective harms, there is a clear case for 
recognizing NCCR as sexual assault within Canadian law, whether or not there was a risk of 
unwanted pregnancy and whether or not the circumstances involved deception. The majority 
decision in Hutchinson works against this recognition by removing NCCR from the scope of 
consent and treating it instead as something that can vitiate an otherwise valid consent. NCCR 
will only be criminalized where there is deception and where complainants face a significant risk 
of unwanted pregnancy, thereby minimizing the non-bodily harms of condom sabotage and 
obscuring the serious impacts for women’s agency, equality, and sense of safety in the world. 
 
50 See generally Lise Gotell, “Reassessing the Place of Criminal Law Reform in the Struggle Against Sexual 
Violence: Responding to the Critique of Carceral Feminism” in Anastasia Powell, Nicola Henry & Asher Flynn, eds, 
Rape Justice Beyond the Realm of Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) 53.  
51 See ibid. 
52 See ibid. See also Wendy Larcombe, “Falling Rape Conviction Rates: (Some) Feminist Aims and Measures for 
Rape Law” (2011) 19:1 Feminist Legal Studies 27. 
The Canadian Legal Framework—R v Hutchinson: Limiting the Scope of Consent 
By the end of the twentieth century, Canadian feminists could claim credit for 
fundamental changes to the Criminal Code provisions on sexual assault, with new evidentiary 
restrictions on sexual history (section 276), strict limitations on the disclosure of complainants’ 
confidential records (section 278.1–.9) and most crucially, the codification of a strong 
framework for consent.53 From the foundation established through these amendments, the 
starting point of sexual assault trials has shifted away from the assumption that women exist in a 
state of perpetual consent, towards the requirement that there be some positive evidence of 
agreement. Canada has moved further in the direction of an affirmative consent standard than 
many other jurisdictions.54  
 In R v Ewanchuk,55 the Supreme Court established a standard for consent that 
approaches “only yes means yes” by unanimously ruling consent cannot be implied, and that 
silence, passivity, or ambiguous conduct cannot be taken as indications of consent.56 The Court 
defined the actus reus of sexual assault as non-consensual sexual touching, where consent is 
 
53 See Criminal Code, supra note 6, s 273.1(1). The enumerated examples where no consent is obtained can be 
found at section 273.1(2)(a)–(e):  
No consent is obtained, for the purposes of [this section], where (a) the agreement is expressed by the words 
or conduct of a person other than the complainant; (b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the 
activity; (c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, 
power or authority; (d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the 
activity; or (e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by words or 
conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity. 
Section 273.2 provides that  
[i]t is not a defence ... that the accused believed that the complainant consented ... where (a) the accused’s 
belief arose from the accused’s: (i) self- induced intoxication, or (ii) recklessness or wilful blindness; or (b) 
the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain 
that the complainant was consenting. 
Most recently, s 273.2(c) has limited the defence of honest mistaken belief in consent to circumstances where there 
is evidence “that the complainant’s voluntary agreement to the activity was affirmatively expressed by words or 
actively expressed by conduct.” 
54 See Craig, supra note 38 at 102; Lise Gotell, “Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberalism and the Erosion of 
Feminist-Inspired Law Reforms” in Clare McGlynn & Vanessa E Munro, eds, Rethinking Rape Law: International 
and Comparative Perspectives (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010) 209 at 209. 
55 1999 1 SCR 330, 169 DLR (4th) 193 [Ewanchuk cited to SCR]. 
56 See ibid at 356–57. 
determined from the subjective perspective of the complainant at the time of the sexual contact 
and whether she wanted the sexual activity to take place.57 Steps to re-establish agreement are 
needed after someone has withdrawn consent.58 Subsequent decisions have reinforced an 
affirmative consent standard by requiring that consent must be specific to the sexual activity in 
question59 and by holding that an accused must have taken active and positive steps to secure 
agreement in order to raise the defence of mistaken belief.60 As the Supreme Court confirmed in 
R v Goldfinch, “[t]oday, not only does no mean no, but only yes means yes. Nothing less than 
positive affirmation is required.”61 In R v JA, the Court determined that there can be no advance 
consent to sexual contact that takes place during unconsciousness, emphasizing that consent 
must be ongoing during each moment of a sexual encounter, and “must be specifically directed 
to each and every sexual act…at the time it occurs.”62 
The majority decision in Hutchinson, which raises the fundamental question of what you 
consent to when you agree to engage in sexual activity, represents a significant retreat from these 
hard fought for advances in the law of consent and a retreat from a truly subjective approach to 
consent. Defence lawyers and some judges have voiced concerns that affirmative consent 
imposes unrealistic requirements on sexual interactions, reflecting underlying fears about over-
criminalizing behaviours that were previously seen as merely immoral.63 Such concerns about 
over-criminalization were at the heart of the Hutchinson appeal, which was decided under the 
 
57 See ibid at 355. 
58 See ibid at paras 357–59. 
59 See e.g. R v Goldfinch, 2019 SCC 39 [Goldfinch]; R v JA, 2011 SCC 28 [JA]. 
60 See e.g. R v Gagnon, 2018 SCC 41; R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 [Barton]. 
61 Goldfinch, supra note 59 at para 44. 
62 JA, supra note 59 at para 34. 
63 See Lise Gotell, “Thinly Construing the Nature of the Act Legally Consented To: The Corrosive Implications of R 
v Hutchinson for the Law of Consent” (2020) 53:1 UBC L Rev 53 at 63–64. See also Craig, supra note 38. 
shadow of the Supreme Court’s harshly punitive approach to HIV non-disclosure.64 In R v 
Cuerrier,65 a case that began at the height of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the Court determined that 
HIV non-disclosure even without transmission could be prosecuted as a form of aggravated 
assault or aggravated sexual assault.66 This decision extended the common law of fraud beyond 
deceptions about the sexual nature of the act and the identity of the sexual partner to include 
deceptions that create “a significant risk of serious bodily harm”, vitiating the complainant’s 
consent under section 265(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.67 In an effort to clearly demarcate what 
deceptions should be subject to criminalization, the Cuerrier majority conflated sexual fraud 
with a risk of serious bodily harm. The legal approach set out in this decision has resulted in both 
the over-criminalization of HIV non-disclosure and a restricted interpretation of the doctrine of 
fraud vitiating consent in other circumstances.68  
 
64 See Isabel Grant, “The Complex Legacy of R v Cuerrier: HIV Nondisclosure Prosecutions and Their Impact on 
Sexual Assault Law” (2020) 58:1 Alta L Rev 45 at 63 [Grant, “The Complex Legacy”]. 
65 1998 2 SCR 371, 162 DLR (4th) 513 [Cuerrier cited to SCR]. 
66 See ibid at 432. 
67 See ibid at 382–83. More recently in R v Mabior, 2012 SCC 47 [Mabior], the Court responded to criticisms of the 
overbreadth of the significant risk test, which has resulted in people with HIV being convicted of aggravated sexual 
assault in circumstances where possibilities of transmission were infinitesimal. In Mabior, the significant risk test 
was framed as requiring that the Crown establish a “realistic possibility of transmission.” This realistic possibility 
would be negated if the accused could establish they had a low viral load at the time in question and if a condom 
was used. Critics argue that the Mabior decision expanded the criminalization of people with HIV because it 
required both condom use and antiretroviral compliance in order to escape criminalization for HIV non-disclosure. 
See generally Isabel Grant, “The Over-Criminalization of Persons with HIV” (2013) 63:3 UTLJ 475.  
Because of criticisms of this harshly punitive approach, the Director of Public Prosecutions has issued a 
prosecutorial directive restricting HIV prosecutions. See Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Public Prosecution 
Service of Canada Deskbook (Ottawa: Attorney General of Canada, 2018), part V, s 5.12. As Grant explains,  
The directive indicates that federal prosecutions will not be initiated where the person living with HIV has 
maintained a suppressed viral load, and that prosecutors will “generally not prosecute” where a person used 
a condom, engaged only in oral sex, or was taking treatment as prescribed, unless other risk factors were 
present: Grant, “The Complex Legacy”, supra note 64 at 48.  
It is noteworthy that the federal government only prosecutes Criminal Code offences in the Territories. See Grant, 
“The Complex Legacy”, supra note 64 at 48, nn 12–14.  
The Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (2019) has issued a position paper recommending that HIV non-
disclosure be removed from sexual offences and that a new summary conviction offence be created that would 
restrict criminalization to intentional or reckless transmission. See LEAF (Women’s Legal Education and Action 
Fund), “A Feminist Approach to Law Reform on HIV Non-Disclosure” (January 2019), online (pdf): <leaf.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/2019-01-08-LEAF-HIV-ND-Position-Paper-FINAL.pdf>. 
68 We believe this approach has resulted in over-criminalization because the law criminalizes people who do not 
disclose their HIV status even where they use a condom or have a low viral load. In other words, the law 
Hutchinson raised the issue of sexual fraud outside of the HIV context for the first time at 
the Supreme Court and revealed the limits of the HIV-driven conception of fraud. The 
complainant in Hutchinson had been in a relationship with the accused, during which time she 
insisted that he wear condoms during intercourse.69 The accused, who was trying to keep the 
complainant in a failing relationship, secretly poked holes in the condoms they were using. After 
discovering that she was pregnant, and after terminating the relationship, the complainant 
underwent an abortion and experienced a resulting infection.70 She became aware that the 
accused had sabotaged the condoms only afterwards, through a series of harassing text messages 
and phone calls.71 Hutchinson’s act of condom sabotage is an example of reproductive 
coercion—restricting reproductive decision making through power and control tactics. 
Hutchinson believed he could maintain control over his sexual partner by forcing her to become 
pregnant. As a recent systematic review has found, reproductive coercion is strongly associated 
with domestic violence.72  
In the majority opinion in Hutchinson, these connections were completely absent in 
reasons that decontextualized the complainant’s choice to engage in sexual intercourse only with 
a condom, and that constructed her repeated refusals to participate in unprotected sex as 
irrelevant to the consent inquiry. The majority recognized that the risk of an unwanted pregnancy 
is a risk of bodily harm, yet it failed to link the deception to consent. This decontextualized 
framing fails to acknowledge the accused’s actions as intimate partner violence, constructing 
 
criminalizes individuals where there is almost no risk of transmitting HIV. See Grant, “The Complex Legacy”, 
supra note 64 at 63. 
69 See R v Hutchinson, 2013 NSCA 1 at para 206 [Hutchinson CA].  
70 See ibid at para 6. 
71 See ibid. 
72 See Karen Trister Grace & Jocelyn C Anderson, “Reproductive Coercion: A Systematic Review” (2018) 19:4 
Trauma Violence Abuse 371 at 383. See also Elizabeth Miller et al, “Reproductive Coercion: Connecting the Dots 
Between Partner Violence and Unintended Pregnancy” (2010) 81:6 Contraception 457; Leah A Plunkett, 
“Contraceptive Sabotage” (2014) 28:1 Colum J Gender & L 97. 
sexual assault as nothing more than people deciding to start or stop sexual activity, informed by 
narrow liberal construction of sexual autonomy that is abstracted from conditions of inequality.73 
This framing obscures how the accused’s abuse limited the complainant’s choice to engage in the 
sexual activity in the first place.  
The central issue in Hutchinson was how to define “voluntary agreement to the sexual 
activity in question” under section 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code. Was the “sexual activity in 
question” in Hutchinson simply vaginal intercourse, or was it vaginal intercourse with a 
condom? The majority, per Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Cromwell, determined that the 
sexual activity in question does not include whether a condom was used, holding that the 
complainant had subjectively consented, but that her consent had been vitiated by fraud.74 The 
concurring minority, per Justices Abella and Moldaver, concluded that the complainant had not 
consented to unprotected sex and there was no need to consider fraud vitiating consent.75  
The majority opinion was a clear departure from Ewanchuk, although purporting to 
uphold that decision. In Ewanchuk, the Court had emphasized that the objective of sexual assault 
law lies in “[h]aving control over who touches one’s body and how”, which “lies at the core of 
human dignity and autonomy”.76 In JA, the majority used the example of condom use when 
arguing that “the unconscious partner cannot meaningfully control how her person is being 
touched, leaving her open to abuse.”77 In Hutchinson, the majority removed the “how” of the 
sexual touching out of the consent inquiry.78 As a result, the purpose of sexual assault law comes 
 
73 See further Janine Benedet, “Marital Rape, Polygamy, and Prostitution: Trading Sex Equality for Agency and 
Choice” (2013) 18:2 Rev Const Stud 161 at 174 (discussing a narrow liberal concept of autonomy). 
74 See Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 6.  
75 See Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 79. 
76 Ewanchuk, supra note 55 at 348 [emphasis added]. 
77 JA, supra note 59 at para 60 [emphasis added]. 
78 See further Grant, “The Complex Legacy”, supra note 64 at 69 (demonstrating that the Hutchinson majority 
actually took the word “how” out of its description of the passage from Ewanchuk). 
to be defined through a superficial construction of sexual autonomy as the decision to engage in 
a type of sexual activity,79 abstracted from the very real distinction between sex with a condom 
and without, all in the name of restraint in criminal law.80 The doctrinal approach to HIV non-
disclosure drove the majority’s decision in Hutchinson, with the Court holding that consistency 
and certainty in the law required all deceptions to be treated in the same way under section 
265(3)(c).81 
The majority thus posited a two-step approach to consent with only agreement to the 
“physical sexual act” (divorced from its context), the sexual nature of the touching, and the 
identity of the person doing the touching being relevant to the consent inquiry.82 The sexual act 
is understood to encompass activities such as “kissing, petting, oral sex, intercourse, or the use of 
sex toys,” but to exclude “the conditions or qualities of the sexual act”.83 Implausibly, for the 
many people who make condom use an integral part of their sexual practices, this restricted 
understanding of sexual activity means that the scope of consent includes agreeing to intercourse, 
but not agreeing only to intercourse with a condom. “Effective condom use,” according to the 
majority decision, “is a method of contraception and protection against sexually transmitted 
disease; it is not a sex act”.84 The second step looks to factors that might vitiate an otherwise 
valid consent, which the Court describes in its later decision in R v GF as “policy 
considerations”.85 
 
79 See Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 18. 
80 See ibid at para 19. 
81 See ibid at para 38. 
82 See ibid at para 54, affirming Farrar JA’s interpretation of the “sexual activity in question” in Hutchinson CA, 
supra note 69. 
83 Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at paras 54–55. 
84 See ibid at para 64. 
85 R v GF, 2021 SCC 20 at para 34 [GF].  
The majority decision rests on an impoverished conception of sexual autonomy divorced 
from any recognition of the inequality women have historically faced around control of their 
reproduction and sexuality. Women are made individually responsible for monitoring any risks 
or threats not encompassed within the narrow definition of “sexual activity in question”, as these 
are placed outside the scope of consent, and beyond criminal legal regulation when there is no 
deception or significant risk of serious bodily harm. By contrast, the concurring opinion in 
Hutchison characterized “the complainant’s right to determine how he or she is sexually 
touched” as a “hard-fought legislative protection,” in a manner that gestures towards the 
systemic consequences of NCCR for gender equality.86 The majority’s approach is flawed, the 
minority contended, because it suggests that only condom sabotage that could result in 
pregnancy would constitute fraud vitiating consent, thereby failing to uphold a complainant’s 
“legal right” to insist on condom use for whatever reason she chooses.87 Sexual assault must be 
defined as sexual touching in a manner that is contrary to the complainant’s wishes.88 The 
minority stopped short of adopting a fully conditional concept of consent that would allow the 
complainant to put any conditions on her consent based on what matters to her, an approach that 
might include other aspects of a sexual agreement beyond how the sexual touching occurs.89 
Instead, the minority emphasized that the scope of consent must include the how of the sexual 
touching, and that being touched by a penis sheathed in a condom is a different sexual activity 
than being touched by an unsheathed penis.90  
 
86 Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 102. 
87 See ibid at para 98.  
88 See ibid at para 102. 
89 See generally Clough, supra note 13; Fischel, supra note 13 (for a discussion of the conditional model of 
consent). 
90 The approach taken the minority is similar to the decision of the British High Court of Justice in Assange v 
Swedish Prosecution Authority, [2011] EWHC 2489 (finding an absence of consent as a result of the accused’s 
NCCR when the complainant had specified that she was only agreeing to protected intercourse). 
By narrowing the scope of consent and reinforcing the myth of “real rape” as defined by 
physical violence, the Hutchinson majority decision represents a backwards shift in Canadian 
law.91 The effect of this decision is to shift the focus of NCCR cases from the analysis of 
subjective consent, where it belongs, to the analysis of vitiating factors. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has further complicated the relationship between fraud and consent in the 2021 decision 
in GF.92 There, the Court doubled down on the two-step approach to consent from Hutchinson. 
The first step is whether the complainant gave what is referred to in GF as to as “subjective 
consent”. The second step is whether that subjective consent is effective “as a matter of law” or 
whether it is vitiated for some policy reason.93 This recent decision shows how Hutchinson has 
had the effect of shifting most of the conceptual limits on consent to the second step, suggesting 
that all the factors in section 273.1(2) that put constraints on consent act to vitiate consent rather 
than to negate it from the outset.94  
The GF Court limited Hutchinson by clarifying that capacity to consent in section 
273.1(2) is a precondition to consent, not something that vitiates an otherwise valid consent:95 no 
capacity, no consent. However, all the factors listed in section 265(3), including fraud and 
whether the complainant was faced with force or threats of force, only vitiate consent. In other 
 
91 This artificially narrow conception of the scope of consent has even led the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of 
Ontario (CLA) to rely on Hutchinson to make the outlandish argument that the degree of force with which the sexual 
activity is accomplished is also not included within the definition of consent. While this argument was ultimately not 
addressed by the Supreme Court in Barton, one can see the dangerous potential of a position that lets men 
unilaterally decide how much force to use during sexual activity. See generally Barton, supra note 60. The CLA 
factum stated at para 8:  
The Court of Appeal said the jury ought to have considered whether [the victim] subjectively consented to 
“sexual activity that involved the degree of force required” to cause her injuries. This reasoning is inconsistent 
with Hutchinson. Consent to the “sexual activity in question” under s. 273.1 only requires agreement to the 
basic physical act, not the precise manner in which the act is carried out: R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 (Factum 
of the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario). 
92 Supra note 85. 
93 See ibid at para 33. 
94 See supra footnote 46 for the relevant Criminal Code provisions.  
95 See GF, supra note 85 at para 43. 
words, subjective consent is present and the threat of force is a policy reason for vitiating that 
subjective consent. Of the list of factors limiting consent in section 273.1(2), only the abuse of 
trust, power, or authority is said to vitiate consent rather than negating it from the outset. While 
this reasoning limits Hutchinson somewhat, it still narrows what is left of subjective consent. It is 
also incoherent. Someone who submits to sexual activity because of “threats or fear of the 
application of force to the complainant” (which the GF majority labelled as vitiating under 
section 265(3)(b)) is not subjectively consenting; she is acquiescing to protect herself from 
violence. Ewanchuk made clear that such submission is not consent. While the GF majority says 
that a complainant can refuse consent at step one “for whatever reason,”96 in fact those reasons 
are limited to a narrow set of factors the Court has decided are valid reasons for refusing 
consent—and whether a condom is used is not one of them.  
As we demonstrate below, the Court’s narrowing of the scope of subjective consent has 
left a confusing legacy for the analysis of whether condom use is within the scope of what a 
woman subjectively consents to when she consents to sexual activity. In our view, overriding 
someone’s insistence on condom use, whether through deceit or outright refusal, must be viewed 
as a violation of subjective consent. A conception of sexual autonomy tied to the value of 
equality demands nothing less. 
Case Law Survey 
We examined cases decided since 1999 (when Ewanchuk established an affirmative 
consent standard) in which complainants specifically agreed to sexual activity with a condom, 
but not without. We searched LexisNexis Quicklaw, and CanLII using the following terms: 
 
96 Ibid at para 33. 
“condom” AND “consent” AND “sexual assault.”97 This search produced a large number of 
results that did not involve NCCR because reference to condoms is ubiquitous in sexual assault 
decisions. The question of whether a condom was worn is frequently part of the narrative in 
sexual assault decisions involving penetrative sex. Judicial analysis of condom use and consent 
may also arise in cases around the assessment of DNA evidence and in other circumstances 
beyond the scope of our NCCR inquiry. For example, the search produced cases in which the 
complainant’s capacity to consent was at issue, and where her demand that the accused wear a 
condom was used to argue that she had an “appreciation of the nature and quality of the sexual 
activity and an understanding that she could agree or decline to engage in, or to continue, the 
sexual activity”.98 Conversely, in some decisions, the complainant’s inability to assess the risk of 
sex without a condom was treated as evidence that she was incapable of consent.99 Insistence on 
condom use might also be used to argue a mistaken belief in consent on the basis that the 
complainant had asked him to wear a condom in the course of a sexual assault. In R v Terkelsen, 
a conversation about condom use was portrayed as a marker of responsible sexual behaviour, not 
as an indicator of agreement to the sexual activity that followed: 
I must recognize that in our modern society the fact that a young woman asks or asked 
about condoms is perfectly normal behaviour….[It] displays a mature approach to the 
prospect of intimate contact between two strangers. Any number of public health 
advertisements would counsel the same approach. Safe sex practices are taught in 
school. There is really nothing significant about the complainant initiating this 
discussion or addressing the subject.100 
 
 
97 Narrower searches, for example, <“conditional consent” AND condom AND “sexual assault,”> or <“condom 
removal” AND “sexual assault”> failed to identify decisions that involved circumstances of NCCR.  
98 See R v Percy, 2018 NSPC 57 at para 106 [Percy]. 
99 See R v Cubillan, 2015 ONSC 969 at para 36 [Cubillon]. 
100 R v Terkelsen, 2016 ONCJ 702 at 36. 
HIV nondisclosure prosecutions also consider whether a condom was used because of the impact 
on risk.101 Finally, the failure to wear a condom in the course of a sexual assault frequently 
appears in sentencing decisions where it is treated as an aggravating factor.102  
Considerations of condom use outside of the specific circumstances of NCCR strongly 
suggest that Canadian judges appreciate differences between sex with a condom and sex without 
a condom. These differences are viewed as being consequential to the riskiness of sex, and 
unprotected penetration is understood as intensifying the harmfulness of sexual assault. Judicial 
recognition of a distinction between protected and unprotected sex sits at odds with the majority 
decision in Hutchinson, which positioned condom use as outside the scope of consent to sexual 
activity. 
As our case law review demonstrates, prior to Hutchinson, judges were clear that whether 
a condom was used was relevant to consent. After Hutchinson, there are conflicting decisions. 
Several judges have actively resisted following Hutchinson either by simply not citing it or 
attempting to distinguish it. Hutchinson, which positioned condom use as collateral to consent to 
sexual activity, is the outlier. 
We found only 19 reported sexual assault cases in which a complainant claimed that her 
consent to sexual activity was premised on condom use (although in some of these cases there 
was a basis to find no consent even with a condom).103 A large majority of these cases were 
 
101 See e.g. R v NG, 2020 ONCA 494. See also Grant, “The Complex Legacy”, supra note 64 at 57–58, 62.  
102 See e.g. R v Owolabi Adejojo, 2019 QCCQ 1555 at para 120; R v Bohorquez and Siddiqi, 2019 ONSC 1643 at 
para 97; R v BZ, 2019 ONSC 2375 at para 25; R v Ignacio, 2019 ONSC 2832 at 23; R v McCaw, 2019 ONSC 3906 
at para 58; R v Razak, 2019 BCSC 1677 at para 77; R v Russ, 2019 BCSC 229 at para 32; R v Solorzano 
Sanclemente, 2019 ONSC 695 at para 49. 
103 The pre–Hutchinson cases are as follows: R v Watson, 2007 CanLII 26 (Ont SC) [Watson]; R v Perkins, 2007 
ONCA 585 [Perkins]; R v Changoo, 2009 ONCJ 220 [Changoo]; R v Poirier, [2014] ABCA 59 [Poirier]. The post–
Hutchinson cases are: R v Dadmand, 2016 BCSC 1565 [Dadmand]; R v SY, 2017 ONCJ 798 [SY]; R v DG, 2018 
ONCJ 727 [DG]; R v Landry, 2019 ONSC 3700 [Landry]; R v BL, 2021 ONCA 373 [BL]; R v Lupi, 2019 ONSC 
3713 [Lupi]; R v Rivera, 2019 ONSC 3918; R v Ukpebor, 2019 ABQB 261 [Ukepbor]; R v Ljiljanic, 2019 ONSC 
6316; R v BAS, 2020 BCSC 657; R v Ma, 2020 ONCA 358 [Ma]; R v Tso, 2020 BCCA 358 [Tso]; Kirkpatrick, 
decided post–Hutchinson (15), with most decided after 2016. While the empirical research 
demonstrates that NCCR is also experienced by men who have penetrative sex with men,104 none 
of the reported cases involved male complainants. All of the accused were men, and all of the 
complainants were women. Young women, in particular, are known to be at greater risk of 
NCCR,105 and where age is reported in the decisions (13 cases), all but one of the complainants 
and accused were under 30. The largest group of cases (seven) involved people intentionally 
meeting up for casual sexual encounters, often (five) after connecting on internet dating apps. As 
Boadle et al found, participating in casual sex or what is known as “hookup culture” appears to 
be a “risk factor” for NCCR.106 Two cases involved complainants who agreed to exchange sex 
for money but only if a condom was worn.107 While NCCR includes deceptive and overt tactics, 
a large majority of these cases (15) did not involve “stealthing,” but instead the overt refusal to 
wear a condom.108 
That there are so few cases, despite empirical research showing the prevalence of NCCR, 
is not surprising. As we have emphasized, the lack of clarity around the legal status of NCCR is 
likely to result in low police reporting rates. The uncertainty about whether condom removal, 
refusal, or sabotage constitutes an absence of consent under section 273 may mean that even 
when survivors report to police, charges are unlikely to be laid. A recent British Columbia case 
 
supra note 10; R v Kraft, 2021 ONSC 1970; R v IAD, 2021 ONCA 110. While these cases involve NCCR, they were 
not all decided on this basis. Watson involved an unsuccessful defence application to exclude evidence on the basis 
of unreasonable search and seizure in the context of a man charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm. The 
complainant was involved in the sex trade and refused consent when the accused refused to wear a condom. DG and 
Ukepbor were decided on the basis of credibility and failure to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Landry was decided on the basis of no consent to intercourse. 
104 See e.g. Czeckowski et al, supra note 3 at 2; Latimer et al, supra note 20 at 5. 
105 See Boadle, Gierer & Buzwell, supra note 21 at 1697. 
106 See ibid at 1699. 
107 See Watson, supra note 103; Ma, supra note 103. 
108 Cases can be difficult to characterize where the complainant alleges that the accused refused to wear a condom, 
but the accused testifies at trial that the condom accidentally fell off. See e.g. Perkins, supra note 103; SY supra note 
103. 
demonstrates this confusion. A woman who reported an incident of stealthing to the RCMP was 
told by the investigating officer: “‘Well, you know, you consented to sex, so there’s no rape or 
crime.’”109 The complainant had to show extraordinary fortitude and speak to seven different 
officers before the accused was finally arrested and charged several weeks later.  
Pre–Hutchinson decisions involving NCCR 
In the four decisions rendered before Hutchinson, judges assessed allegations of NCCR 
within the scope of the consent inquiry, recognizing that consent to protected sex is a different 
sexual activity than consent to unprotected sex.  
In R v Perkins,110 according to the accused’s testimony, he had worn a condom during 
consensual sex, but it fell off when he lost his erection. The complainant testified that the 
accused raped her without a condom.  The Court of Appeal for Ontario made it clear that consent 
to sex with a condom is different than consent to sex without: 
It was common ground between [the complainant] and the appellant that he was 
not wearing a condom when he ejaculated. Even on the appellant’s evidence, [the 
complainant] would not have consented to unprotected sex. It therefore became 
important to determine whether the appellant was wearing a condom that came off 
during the sexual activity, or whether the appellant was never wearing one as 
alleged by the Crown.111  
 
The Court of Appeal ultimately ordered a new trial partly on the basis that the trial judge 
erred in concluding that “a virile young man” would not lose his erection in the 
circumstances.112  
 
109 Catharine Tunney, “BC Woman Says Mounties Need Better Training on Investigating Condom-Free ‘Stealthing’ 
Assaults,” CBC News (21 June 2021), online: <cbc.ca/news/politics/rcmp-stealthing-sexual-assault-1.6062324>. 
110 Supra note 103. 
111 Ibid at para 30. 
112 Ibid at para 35. 
In R v Poirier,113 the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the accused’s conviction for the 
sexual assault of a 14-year-old. Because the trial judge had a reasonable doubt that the 
accused believed the complainant was above the age of consent, the analysis of the sexual 
assault charge turned on whether she had consented. The allegations at issue involved 
deception about wearing a condom, and the trial judge treated this deception as a lack of 
voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question. The Court of Appeal agreed:  
The Appellant also admitted to lying to the complainant about wearing a condom. 
Even if the complainant consented to protected sex, there is no doubt on this 
record that she did not consent to unprotected sex. Further, the evidence about 
anal intercourse does not suggest that the Appellant honestly but mistakenly 
thought the complainant affirmatively communicated her consent to anal 
intercourse at all, much less unprotected anal intercourse.114 
Here, acts of unprotected vaginal and anal intercourse were treated by the trial judge as specific 
forms of sexual activity, distinct from penetration with a condom. This analytic framing was 
simply accepted on appeal.  
Judges in these early cases appreciated the complex individual and collective harms 
caused by NCCR. In R v Changoo,115 the accused was convicted of sexual assault after ignoring 
the complainant’s insistence on a condom. In sentencing, Lane J took pains to describe how the 
sexual assault culminated in an “abusive and threatening verbal barrage,”116 thus situating this 
act of NCCR within the context of the accused’s aggressive and controlling conduct towards the 
complainant. That this abuse happened just after the complainant objected to the condom 
removal reveals the role of power, control, and objectification often found in NCCR: 
[T]the assault culminated in an abusive and threatening verbal barrage in which 
Mr. Changoo told the complainant that she was “really selfish and unfair” to him; 
that people “don’t say no” to him, that “because you are new, he would let it go 
 
113 Supra note 103. 
114 Ibid at para 8. 
115 Supra note 103. 
116 Ibid at para 3. 
this time but you are never to say no to him again,” that she was insulting to him, 
that “what was the difference between a condom and not a condom,” that she was 
talking back to him, “If a man talks back to him, he punches him out; I was a girl, 
think about that. Women talk back to me too much now, and that was wrong,” and 
that she was not “submissive enough.”117 
 
We were unable to find a single pre–Hutchinson decision that treated condom use as collateral to 
consent. 
Post–Hutchinson NCCR Decisions 
The decisions following Hutchinson demonstrate the lack of clarity left in the wake of 
that decision. Some courts have distinguished deceptions about condoms from cases where the 
accused simply ignored the complainant’s insistence on a condom, with the former going to 
fraud and the latter to consent.118 Other cases have flatly ignored Hutchinson—perhaps because 
of the direction it would lead them. Overall, these decisions demonstrate the profound confusion 
left in the wake of the Hutchinson majority’s finding that condom use is “collateral” to 
subjective consent. 
The first decision on this issue after Hutchinson was R v SY,119 where the complainant 
was the ex-girlfriend of the accused. She testified that the accused went to her home to talk to 
her, refused to leave, and blocked her exit. After several hours, she agreed to have sexual 
intercourse with him to get him to leave but only if he wore a condom.120 She testified that in the 
middle of the intercourse he began to laugh and asked her if she thought he was wearing a 
condom. When she said yes, he pointed to the condom lying on the bed. She was immediately 
upset, stopped the sexual activity, and left the room. She testified that he later forcibly raped her. 
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The accused, by contrast, testified that the two of them had consensual intercourse. He agreed 
that she had insisted on a condom but indicated that it must have fallen off during intercourse, 
possibly when he lost his erection.121 While the trial judge believed the accused that the condom 
fell off accidentally, he did state that “[i]f S.Y. intentionally removed the condom and then 
continued to have sexual intercourse with A.C., I am satisfied that the offence of sexual assault 
would have been made out.”122 The judge did not cite Hutchinson nor mention fraud.   
R v Dadmand123was one of the few cases directly involving stealthing. The accused 
pretended to be a modelling agent and tricked women into believing he would sign them to 
lucrative contracts if they engaged in sexual activity with him on video.124 In one of the counts, 
the video evidence clearly showed the accused engaging in stealthing:  
He directs [the complainant] to assume various physical positions and perform 
various sex acts. At one point S.T. says “I hope we are almost done.” When the 
accused prepares to have intercourse from behind her the second time, she says 
“We already did this.” She requests the accused to put on a condom. After he does 
so, he removes it when he is behind her. S.T. later observes the accused is not 
wearing the condom, and comments “The condom is not even on.” S.T. puts the 
condom on again, and then the accused removes it when S.T. turns her back to 
him.125 
 
The accused’s NCCR was simply ignored in the reasons for judgment. The sexual interaction 
within which this occurred was found to have been consensual and the accused was acquitted.126 
Pearlman J’s discussion of Hutchinson earlier in the decision clearly set the stage for this finding. 
He indicated that, “the need for restraint and certainty has influenced the law’s approach to 
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consent, particularly where consent has been obtained by deception”.127 Following Hutchinson, 
deception negating consent must “carry with it the risk of serious harm”.128 Pearlman J found 
that Crown had not led any evidence to support the existence of a “significant risk” sufficient to 
ground the negation of consent by fraud.129 The defendant’s NCCR was placed beyond the scope 
of criminal law. 
Dadmand’s restricted interpretation of the scope of consent, along with the insistence that 
fraud vitiating consent requires an evidentiary foundation (to substantiate a risk of pregnancy, 
STIs, or other serious bodily harms), point towards a hesitant legal approach to NCCR. What 
kind of evidence would the Crown have to lead to prove that the complainant was capable of 
becoming pregnant? The profound violation of privacy involved in such a requirement, opening 
the door to invasive questioning by police, Crown, and defence regarding the complainant’s risk 
of physical harm, will only deter complainants from proceeding. Responsibility for managing the 
risk of NCCR becomes an individual responsibility, placed beyond criminal legal regulation. The 
message is clear. Women are expected to carefully conform to the norms of sexual safekeeping 
in order to avoid being subjected to unprotected penetration against their will. Decisions such as 
Hutchinson and Dadmand construct women, as Ben McJunkin puts it, as “discriminating 
purchasers, both empowered and obligated to see through a ‘seller’s puffery,’ ignoring the 
profound inequality often present in sexual relationships.”130 
R v Lupi131 reveals how Hutchinson has required judges to force condom refusal into the 
fraud framework in order to reach a just result. The accused and the complainant had met on an 
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internet dating site. The accused admitted to being aware that the complainant limited her 
consent to sexual activity with a condom, testifying that the she had made it “absolutely clear” 
that refusing to wear a condom would be a “deal breaker”.132 The trial judge accepted the 
complainant’s evidence that she heard a snapping sound during penetrative sex with the accused 
after he moved behind her.133 The accused continued to have intercourse with her for a few 
seconds after he removed the condom.134  
The trial judge convicted the accused, distinguishing the facts from Hutchinson because 
in this case there was clearly no consent to penetration without a condom at the time of the 
sexual intercourse.135 The trial judge acknowledged how NCCR undermines women’s sexual 
integrity and agency, and how this in turn reinforces gender inequality: “‘Mr. Lupi’s actions 
fundamentally affected Ms. V’s consent….[They] deprived her of control over her sexual 
activity’ and ‘flew in the face of the Charter values of equality and autonomy’.”136 He went on to 
hold that if this approach was mistaken, then the complainant’s consent would have been vitiated 
by fraud.137 
On a summary conviction appeal, Justice Roberts found that the trial judge had erred in 
his approach to consent, and that the circumstances described by the complainant fell squarely 
within the framework set by the Hutchinson majority.138 He concluded that the appropriate 
approach was instead to consider whether her consent was vitiated by fraud, finding that “[t]he 
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surreptitious removal of the condom was directly contrary to Ms. V’s express wishes. Mr. Lupi 
literally did this behind her back. It was dishonest.”139  
Roberts J stressed the importance of evidence of physical harm, describing how the 
complainant had engaged in lengthy courses of prophylactic treatment that established that she 
experienced a clear risk of unwanted pregnancy and STIs.140 In concluding that the accused’s 
stealthing vitiated the complainant’s consent, Roberts J held: 
In sum, it was readily apparent from the record that the harm here went well-
beyond “financial deprivations or mere sadness or stress from being lied to” and 
extended to serious bodily harm, or the risk of serious bodily harm, both by 
substantially interfering with Ms. V’s well-being, and exposing her to the risk of 
an unwanted pregnancy.141 
Despite Robert J’s acknowledgement of the psychological harms the complainant suffered, he 
minimized the serious emotional and dignitary harms of NCCR, constructing those feelings as 
“mere sadness.”142  
In R v Rivera,143 notwithstanding the finding in Hutchinson, the trial judge recognized 
that the use of a condom was central to consent. The complainant and the accused met on an 
online dating website; they exchanged messages where the complainant indicated that “she had 
two rules: condoms were a must and ‘no means no.’”144 Mr. Rivera texted back that he was 
“‘totally Ok with that’”.145 The complainant testified that when she insisted on a condom after 
they met in person, the accused replied that “it will be OK, I’m clean,” after which he simply 
proceeded with condom-less intercourse, overriding her clear verbal instructions.146 In shock, she 
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testified that she froze and “laid there limp”.147 The trial judge accepted the complainant’s story 
of what then occurred, finding that the fact that she went to the hospital the next day for a 
pregnancy test, STI tests, and a sexual assault kit supported her credibility.148 
Justice Champagne made clear that there was no voluntary agreement to the sexual 
activity in question: 
In my view, sex without a condom is a qualitatively different act than sex with a 
condom and the complainant’s consent was withdrawn when Mr. Rivera 
penetrated her without a condom without her overt agreement. When a condom is 
used as a form of birth control or to prevent sexually transmitted infections, its 
use provides participants with a sense of security. The non-use of a condom 
against a participant’s wishes not only usurps that [individual’s] sexual autonomy 
and right to make decisions about how she/he/they engage in sexual activity, it is 
an activity against that person’s will, fraught with the [gamut] of emotions 
resulting from an assault.149 
Perhaps recognizing that her decision was vulnerable on appeal because of Hutchinson, 
Justice Champagne offered an alternate path to conviction through fraud: “If there is any doubt 
that sex without a condom amounts to sexual assault in these circumstances, I find that the 
complainant’s consent was vitiated by fraud (s 265(3) Criminal Code)”.150 In this case, there was 
a significant risk of bodily harm because of the increased risk of unwanted pregnancy and 
STIs.151 Justice Champagne found that the accused engaged in deception when he “[led] the 
complainant to believe he would wear a condom as he had previously agreed to do so and at the 
last minute he penetrated her without a condom telling her it would be ok”.152 This analysis 
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expands the understanding of what constitutes a deception. Here, the failure to follow through on 
a prior commitment to use condoms is squeezed into the category of fraud.153 
R v Kirkpatrick154 was the first Canadian provincial appellate decision to consider the 
implications of Hutchinson for consent and condom use as the main issue on appeal. The Court 
of Appeal for British Columbia divided along the same lines as in Hutchinson, with the majority 
holding that condom refusal is conceptually different from condom deception and that 
Hutchinson only excludes deceptive condom removal from subjective consent. The case is 
currently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, offering an opportunity for the Court to 
reconsider Hutchinson as it applies to NCCR.  
In Kirkpatrick, once again the complainant and the accused met on a dating website. The 
complainant testified that she told the accused that she always insists on condom use, although 
the accused denied this conversation took place.155 She visited the accused at his house and the 
two engaged in some consensual sexual activity. The accused then asked her to “‘hop on’ top of 
him.”156 She inquired about whether he had a condom, and he reached into the bedside table to 
get one.157 After they were finished, the complainant asked to see the condom because she 
wanted to be sure he had worn one.158 In the middle of the night, she awoke and noticed that the 
accused was aroused. She testified that she assumed that, when Kirkpatrick leaned towards the 
bedside table, he was getting another condom, and they again had vaginal intercourse, with the 
accused asking her if it “felt better this way”.159 The complainant assumed that the question was 
 
153 Cf Landry, supra note 103 at para 6; BL, supra note 103 at para 5. In this case, the complainant did not consent to 
sexual intercourse and said no, “especially not without a condom”. The accused forced intercourse on the 
complainant without a condom and thus this case involved a more direct finding of non-consent. 
154 Supra note 10. 
155 See ibid at para 5. 
156 Ibid at para 6. 
157 See ibid. 
158 See ibid at para 7.  
159 Ibid at para 13. 
related to the sexual position, and only realized that the accused was not wearing a condom when 
he ejaculated.160 Later she confronted him by text and he responded with “abusive” messages, 
one of which included a link to a porn video entitled “‘OMG Daddy came inside me’”.161 In the 
aftermath, the complainant attended the hospital and suffered serious side effects from the 
preventative HIV treatment she underwent for 28 days.162 
The trial judge granted a no-evidence motion on the basis that the complainant had 
agreed to the sexual activity in question (which he defined as vaginal intercourse) and that there 
had been no deception, determining that there was therefore no reasonable basis upon which a 
trier of fact could convict.163 In concluding that the accused did not deceive the complainant, the 
trial judge relied on evidence that he had asked the complainant to guide his penis into her 
vagina and that he therefore did not hide the fact that he was not wearing a condom.164 On a 
Crown appeal, Justice Groberman for the majority found that protected sex is a specific form of 
sexual activity that is included within the scope of the sexual activity consented to and therefore 
ordered a new trial.  
While all three appellate judges in Kirkpatrick would have overturned the directed 
verdict, the Court was deeply divided on the scope of Hutchinson. For the majority, Groberman J 
took the position that there was no consent to the sexual activity in question, i.e. sex without a 
condom, while Justice Bennett’s concurring minority found that the only path to conviction was 
through the doctrine of fraud.  
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The majority decision recognized that failing to see condom use as going to consent 
would be “seriously out of touch with reality, and dysfunctional in terms of its protection of 
sexual autonomy.”165 Groberman J held that the Hutchinson majority was primarily concerned 
with how including the “intact state of the condom” within the scope of the “sexual activity in 
question” would extend the scope of voluntary agreement to “potentially infinite collateral 
conditions”.166 He went on to contend that “[n]othing in the judgment suggests that there was an 
intention on the part of the majority to specifically exclude from the definition of ‘the sexual 
activity in question’ physical aspects of sexual activity adopted for birth control or disease 
prevention purposes”.167 In other words, the Kirkpatrick majority decision draws a distinction 
between condom refusal (intercourse without a condom) and condom deception (intercourse with 
a condom full of holes), and asserts that while the latter is collateral to the consent inquiry, the 
Hutchinson majority never intended to exclude the former from the definition of “the sexual 
activity in question.”168 Justice Groberman rejected fraud as a possible path to conviction. There 
was nothing in the facts to suggest that the accused intentionally deceived the complainant; he 
simply refused to comply with her insistence on condom use.169 If the majority analysis is 
correct, there is one pathway to conviction for condom refusal, which negates subjective consent, 
and another more onerous test if the NCCR involves deception, requiring proof a significant risk 
of serious bodily harm.  
The concurring minority opinion honed in on the Hutchinson majority’s clear conclusion 
that “[e]ffective condom use is a method of contraception and protection against sexually 
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transmitted disease; it is not a sex act”, indicating that it was not open to the majority to find that 
condom use is part of the definition of a sexual activity.170 To criminalize a sabotaged condom 
differently than the refusal to wear a condom does not offer “a ‘principled and clear line’171. . . 
between what is and is not part of the nature of a sexual act”.172 
Justice Bennett, following Hutchinson, treated condom use as collateral to the “sexual 
activity in question,” and as only relevant to the second stage of the consent analysis, which 
looks at whether any factors vitiated an otherwise valid consent.173 She held that there was 
sufficient evidence to proceed to trial on the fraud issue, holding that “[t]here was ample 
evidence that [the complainant] would not consent to sexual intercourse without a condom and, 
on her evidence, Mr. Kirkpatrick was well aware of this, yet he failed to disclose that he was not 
wearing one”.174 Justice Saunders agreed with Justice Groberman on the consent issue but, 
alternatively, agreed with Justice Bennett on fraud, thus leaving the Supreme Court of Canada 
with an “out” should it want to uphold the decision without departing from Hutchinson.175  
The Court of Appeal for Ontario has disregarded Kirkpatrick and Hutchinson in two 
recent decisions involving condom refusal. In R v Ma,176 the Court dealt with this issue in the 
context of a complainant involved in the sex trade who always insisted on a condom. When she 
refused to participate in unprotected sex with the accused, he penetrated her regardless. The trial 
judge convicted the accused of sexual assault, and the Court of Appeal agreed, citing neither 
Hutchinson nor Kirkpatrick: 
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In our view, the appellant’s refusal to use a condom and his subsequent use of a 
boxcutter to stroke the neck of the second complainant as he kissed her entitled 
the trial judge to conclude that sexual activity that started as consensual evolved 
later into a non-consensual sexual assault.177  
 
Similarly, in R v IAD,178 a case involving mistaken belief in consent, the Court treated the 
complainant’s insistence on condom use as being an integral part of the sexual activity in 
question and therefore, essential to the analysis of the mistaken belief in consent defence: 
We agree with the appellant that this case required a clear inquiry into the 
reasonable steps potentially taken by the respondent. This is particularly true given 
both the complainant and respondent’s clear evidence that she asked for a condom, 
yet the sexual intercourse ensued without one. Even taking the respondent’s 
evidence at its highest, this is a circumstance that was known to him at the time that 
the intercourse commenced, yet he did not inquire of the complainant whether she 
wished to proceed without a condom.179 
At least one court has relied on Kirkpatrick as a persuasive authority that protects a 
complainant’s right to limit her voluntary agreement to intercourse with a condom. R v Kraft180 
involved a summary conviction appeal of an acquittal in a case involving the question of consent 
to unprotected intercourse. The complainant and the accused engaged in consensual foreplay but, 
in the absence of any discussion, the accused penetrated the complainant without telling her he 
was going to do so. The complainant immediately informed the accused that he had to put a 
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condom on.181 At issue on appeal was the trial judge’s treatment of this single act of unprotected 
intercourse, both with respect to consent and mistaken belief in consent. 
The trial judge had imposed the Hutchinson fraud formula, holding that condoms are not 
sex acts, that the complainant had consented to the intercourse, and that, because there was no 
deception, there was nothing to negate her voluntary agreement. In rejecting this approach, 
Justice Williams, cited Kirkpatrick for the proposition that “condom use is highly relevant to the 
consent analysis: no condom, no consent”.182 Williams J agreed that sex without a condom is a 
specific form of sexual activity. Because the accused had taken no steps to clarify the 
complainant’s consent, he was not entitled to claim that he mistakenly believed that the 
complainant was consenting to sex without a condom.  
It is abundantly evident from these recent decisions that Hutchinson has created a lack of 
clarity about whether condom use is part of what is consented to. We have seen judges try to 
expand the notion of deception in order to fit into the narrow constraints of Hutchinson, and we 
have seen judges disregard Hutchinson altogether.  The Supreme Court has a unique opportunity 
in Kirkpatrick to retreat from the confusing and unprincipled logic of Hutchinson, and we hope it 
rises to the occasion. 
Legislative Options 
Relying on doctrinal developments to provide clarity can be risky for feminists. Supreme 
Court decisions may turn on complicated points of law, and, as we saw in Hutchinson and GF, 
on concerns about how those developments impact other areas of law not before the Court. The 
Supreme Court may be reluctant to reconsider a decision as recent as Hutchinson, 
notwithstanding the legal confusion left in its wake. If the Court declines to retreat from 
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Hutchinson, law reform will be necessary to address the widespread and pervasive phenomenon 
of NCCR. 
Cross-nationally, there have been several efforts to secure legal remedies for NCCR both 
through civil and criminal law reforms.183 As we have argued here, NCCR constitutes sexual 
assault because the survivor has not voluntarily agreed to penetrative sex without a condom. 
While civil actions for NCCR could be empowering for survivors, offering them control over the 
process and the possibility of compensation for the harms suffered, civil remedies are slow and 
costly, and thus not accessible to many complainants. Nor does an individualized civil remedy 
have the same expressive function as criminal law. As Chesser and Zahra have argued, “[i]f the 
sexual wrong of stealthing was rectified by a civil remedy, society may perceive stealthing as a 
wrong less severe than other sexual offences shielded by the criminal law.”184 For this reason, 
many jurisdictions are contemplating criminal law reform to designate NCCR as a form of sexual 
assault. 
Criminal law reforms in other jurisdictions have paralleled the divergent approaches 
taken by the majority and concurring opinions in Hutchinson. In 2019, Singapore became the 
first country to pass a criminal law amendment to respond to stealthing.185 Using a fraud 
formulation that shares most of the weaknesses of the Hutchinson majority position, the 
Singapore Penal Code now criminalizes misrepresentation about “sexually protective measures” 
as its own offence: “procurement of sexual activity by deception.” Similarly, there is currently an 
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opposition-sponsored bill before the Legislature of Australian Capital Territory that would 
amend the Crimes Act to include “the intentional misrepresentation by the other person about the 
use of a condom” as fraud negating consent.186  
In contrast to law reforms that restrict criminalization to deceptive forms of condom 
removal, a New York bill passed but still pending in committee would criminalize the 
“unconsented to removal or tampering with a sexually protective device” as a form of sexual 
battery.187 While encompassing both deceptive and overt forms of non-consensual condom 
removal, the broad definition of “sexually protective devices” creates the potential for women to 
be criminalized when they interfere with contraceptive devices, ignoring how the experience of 
unprotected penetration and the risk of unwanted pregnancy represent specific forms of gendered 
harm. This is one reason the Hutchinson minority limited its judgment to the how of sexual 
activity, explicitly not extending its reach to the consequences of sexual activity.   
Perhaps the clearest proposal for law reform, and one that best captures how NCCR 
violates sexual integrity and gender equality, has recently been proposed by the New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission. Within a set of recommendations aimed at simplifying and 
strengthening the law of sexual consent, the Commission proposes an amendment to the Crimes 
Act that would provide that “a person who consents to a particular sexual activity is not, by 
reason only of that fact, to be taken to consent to another sexual activity,” stating that “a person 
who consents to sexual activity using a condom is not to be taken, by reason only of that fact, to 
consent to sexual activity without using a condom.”188 This amendment thus clearly defines sex 
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with a condom as a specific form of sexual activity within the scope of the consent inquiry. The 
government has committed to legislating these proposed changes, making NSW the first 
jurisdiction to explicitly recognize the right to limit consent to protected sex.189  
The Canadian Parliament could accomplish the same result by amending section 273.1 of 
the Criminal Code to clarify that whether a condom is used is part of “the sexual activity in 
question” to which one must voluntarily agree. A simple definition of “sexual activity in 
question” could make clear that the complainant must consent to each sexual activity, and how it 
is performed, including whether a condom is used.  
Conclusion 
Concern about NCCR has been constructed as a hysterical moral panic that is complicit 
in the regressive politics of the carceral state. To the contrary, NCCR needs to be understood as a 
widespread form of gender-based violence. As long as we criminalize sexual assault as a 
violation of sexual autonomy, NCCR must be understood as non-consensual. It is a form of 
sexual touching that the complainant does not want to take place. While violative condom 
practices can subject survivors to the risks of unwanted pregnancies and STIs, these acts also 
produce complex forms of harm, undermine survivors’ sexual agency and dignity, and reinforce 
a form of masculinity defined by sexual conquest, premised on the objectification of women, and 
antithetical to any concept of sexual equality. Whether the criminal law recognizes a person’s 
autonomy to choose whether or not to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse should not 
depend on whether they are capable of becoming pregnant. How the sexual activity is undertaken 
must be part of the consent inquiry. 
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The Canadian cases discussed in this paper illustrate how NCCR interacts with patterns 
of abuse and degradation, whether enacted as a form of reproductive coercion within a 
relationship characterized by coercive control, performed within a more elaborate scheme of 
sexual deception, or perpetrated by men in the context of casual sexual encounters. The case law 
reveals that NCCR is sometimes followed up by abusive tirades, texts, and unsolicited stealthing 
porn. It is precisely the manipulation, deception, and the transgression of boundaries that are 
eroticized by NCCR. 
The analytical framework established by Hutchinson draws a number of untenable 
distinctions that work to insulate some forms of NCCR from criminal sanction. Even though the 
definition of consent in Canadian law is supposed to be subjective, by defining condom use as 
collateral to the consent inquiry, Hutchinson paternalistically informs survivors that they 
subjectively consented to acts that they did not agree to and may have experienced as deeply 
violating at the time they occurred. The test for sexual fraud directs attention only to practices 
that are deceptive and that risk serious bodily harm, thus minimizing violations of women’s 
sexual agency and dignity, which can be dismissed as “mere sadness.”190 It is noteworthy that in 
several of these prosecutions, judges referred to the fact that complainants behaved as 
responsible risk managers, who carefully surveilled their sexual partners’ condom use and 
immediately sought testing and prophylaxis when their vigilance failed. Conversely, however, as 
the treatment of NCCR in Dadmand suggests, a complainant who fails to approximate the 
normative standard of the risk-managing good victim may be denied legal protection. 
Establishing a complainant’s status as a good victim according to this overemphasis on physical 
harm requires that she be willing to have confidential medical information disclosed in court. 
 
190 Lupi, supra note 103 at para 40, citing the majority judgment in Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 72. 
Postmenopausal, pregnant, infertile, or trans women, as well as men who insist on condom use 
when having sex with men, are simply out of luck unless their sexual partner had an STI.  
Ultimately, the Hutchinson formula creates a number of unprincipled distinctions 
between those situations of NCCR subject to legal regulation and those relegated to the realm of 
ethical and moral harms. Why should there be legal distinctions drawn between deceptive forms 
of NCCR and those that are carried out blatantly, when the difference between the two 
circumstances can turn on factors that should be insignificant to the definition of sexual assault?  
This may amount to drawing a legal distinction based on the mere seconds before the 
complainant discovers that her insistence on protected sex has been violated or whether the 
accused was in front or behind her when he penetrated her without a condom.  
Judges appear to be resisting the Hutchinson framework precisely because the result 
conflicts with their common sense understanding of what consent means. The Court of Appeal 
majority opinion in Kirkpatrick could be characterized as a deliberate misreading of Hutchinson 
and an invitation for the Supreme Court to revisit the conclusion that condom use is collateral to 
the sexual activity in question. Whether or not the Court takes up this invitation, feminist legal 
scholars committed to substantive equality must rise to the challenge of forging a principled 
basis for defining the scope of consent to sexual activity.  
Where a complainant insists on condom use, it is surely not unduly onerous to require a 
man to either use a condom or refrain from sexual intercourse. To argue that a woman who 
consents to vaginal intercourse only with a condom is giving subjective consent to any vaginal 
intercourse without a condom resurrects the much-discredited notion of implied consent—that 
agreement in one context implies agreement in a completely different context. The majority 
position in Hutchinson is quite simply a form of implied consent—a doctrine explicitly rejected 
by the Supreme Court in Ewanchuk.  
While we strongly support the conclusion of the Kirkpatrick majority that disregard of 
the complainant’s insistence on condom use negates subjective consent, it is inconsistent with the 
absurd conclusion from Hutchinson that consent to sex with a condom implies subjective consent 
to sex without a condom unless vitiated by fraud. Extending fraud, as the minority does in 
Kirkpatrick, to cases where there is no clear evidence of deception is not the solution nor is 
making an artificial distinction between deceptions and overt disregard of the complainant’s 
wishes on condom use. It is essential to rethink the definition of “the sexual activity in question” 
with respect to condom use and how the sexual activity is carried out.  
The Supreme Court of Canada has a unique opportunity in Kirkpatrick to rethink a 
decision made by only four justices of that Court that has left the law “seriously out of touch 
with reality, and dysfunctional in terms of its protection of sexual autonomy.”191 The Court can 
make this adjustment without upending the meaning of voluntary agreement and the structure of 
subjective consent set out in GF. The Court need only acknowledge that “the sexual activity in 
question” includes the complainant’s express wishes about whether a condom was used. We urge 
the Court to allow Canadians to determine for themselves whether or not they are willing to 
consent to sex without a condom. If the Court fails to rise to the occasion, Parliament should 
intervene and amend the definition of consent in section 273.1 by including condom use and how 




191 Kirkpatrick, supra note 10 at para 3. 
